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Results 
After voting in two rounds of elections in the Spring of 1994, El Salvadorans elected a president, 
a vice-president (on the same ticket), 84 legislative deputies and 262 municipal boards. Armando 
Calderón Sol (a former Mayor of San Salvador) of the rightist ARENA (National Republican 
Alliance) received 49.03 per cent of the vote on 20 March; having narrowly missed obtaining the 
required absolute majority of the popular vote (50 per cent plus one), he was forced into a run-off 
election on 24 April. In this election, Calderón Sol defeated his only rival, Ruben Zamora of the 
leftist FMLN/CD/MNR (Farbundo Marti Liberation Front/Democratic Convergence/National 
 
 
 
Revolutionary Movement) coalition by attracting the support of 68.35 per cent of the voters. 
ARENA won 39 of the seats in the legislature; by forming an alliance with the conservative PCN 
(Party of National Conciliation), it created a majority of 43 deputies to cement its control of this 
branch of government. These results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Despite numerous irregularities, these elections are a watershed in modern El Salvadoran 
politics. They are one of the most important indicators that the peace agreement negotiated by 
the Left and Right in the early 1990s remains in effect. 
 
Background 
The peace accord, as well as the resulting elections, were made possible by the collapse of 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. The transformation of international politics 
encouraged the Bush Administration to pressure the ARENA government of Alfredo Cristiani 
(1989-1994) and a recalcitrant military to reach a settlement with the FMLN guerrillas. After a 
decade of vicious civil war, both government and armed opposition also came to recognize that 
the civil war was stalemated. Under UN sponsorship, Left and Right signed what became known 
as the Chapultepec Accord on 16 January 1992 to reduce the size of the military, to separate it 
from the police, to create a Truth Commission to investigate past human rights abuses and to 
reform the constitution and the electoral system. Both the agreement and the supervision of its 
implementation were entrusted to the United Nations.
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It was not going to be easy to hold elections in a country where, for example, the Truth 
Commission documented at least 22,000 killings, mostly committed by the security forces and 
their paramilitary allies (other estimates run at least twice as high).
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 Simply organizing for what 
became known as the "election of the century" in a country where 1,176,900 to 1,606,900 
individuals were forced to become internal or external refugees in the 1980s presented logistical 
challenges.
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 Fear of reprisals or of a return to open warfare undoubtedly discouraged many 
citizens from becoming involved in what hopefully would become genuinely competitive 
elections. Uncertainty about the electoral strength of the Left unnerved many in government, the 
military and their conservative supporters. Distrust of the ARENA government and of a military 
believed to be responsible for the vast majority of human rights abuses led ex-guerrillas and their 
supporters to believe that the electoral process would not be completely fair. 
 
Polls conducted in the months before the elections revealed the existence of large numbers of 
uncommitted voters. In a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Institute of the University of 
Central America in San Salvador (IUDOP) between 5 and 13 February 1994, 10 per cent of the 
respondents said they would not vote for any candidate and 23 per cent said they did not know 
for whom they would vote. The same poll indicated that 35 per cent favored Calderón Sol, 17 per 
cent preferred Zamora and 10 per cent planned to vote for Fidel Chavez Mena of the PDC 
(Christian Democratic Party). Most prior surveys disclosed that Calderón Sol was the most 
popular candidate, but that he did not have enough votes to win the presidential election 
outright.
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The election was fraught with difficulties, despite extensive technical and logistical assistance 
from ONUSAL (the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador), foreign governments and 
other international organizations. Criticism concentrated upon the electoral registry and the new 
system of identification cards devised for the election. A poll sponsored by the UN in mid-1993 
revealed that 786,000 voters did not have electoral identification cards. 
 
Out of a total of 2.7 million registered Salvadorans (the estimate offered by ONUSAL), 300,000 
voters had not received their cards by election day. 75,000 citizens had had their applications 
rejected, often because their birth certificates were not on file with the Electoral Tribunal. While 
municipal archives had been destroyed during the war, many citizens were unable to register 
because Mayors, most of whom belonged to ARENA, did not deliver copies of birth certificates 
to the Electoral Tribunal. Finally, 300,000 electoral identification cards were never retrieved; 
according to many opposition sectors, these were not just duplicates or simply belonged to 
individuals that were deceased or had left the country. They argued that these shortcomings 
demonstrated that the ARENA-dominated government did not want to hold a competitive and 
transparent election. 
 
Other problems marred the first and second rounds of voting. According to ONUSAL, 
approximately 25,000 voters with electoral identification cards were prevented from voting 
because the numbers of their documents did not correspond with those of the lists of voters 
contained by polling centers. Other organizations claimed that as many as 100,000 to 250,000 
citizens were deprived of their suffrage rights in this manner. 
 
The organization of polling centers and stations also added to confusion on election day. In each 
voting district, one polling center existed alongside a large number of polling stations; the former 
distributed lists of voters to the latter, where citizens cast their ballots. Though not a problem in 
lightly populated areas, this arrangement became cumbersome in large districts, like San 
Salvador, where 30 per cent of the electorate resides. When combined with the shortage of buses 
and other vehicles to transport voters, many citizens became disillusioned and were unable to 
vote on election day. 
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 Voter apathy, registry and polling station flaws led to a turnout rate of 52 
per cent in the first election and 46 per cent in the run-off. 
 
How a party associated with death squad activities and the wealthiest social sectors can triumph 
in elections, challenges sociological theories of voting. One way to begin resolving this puzzle is 
by recognizing that Calderón Sol is viewed as an efficacious and practical administrator. The 
pre-election poll cited above discloses that 52 per cent of the respondents stated "he has fulfilled 
his promises" or that "he does good work." His party's alleged ties with the death squads and 
links with the wealthy of El Salvador apparently did not taint his effort to become its next 
president. 
 
It may very well be the case that the political inexperience of the guerrillas, coupled with the 
collapse of the Marxist-influenced development schemes in the post- Cold War era, made large 
numbers of citizens nervous. Since it won the presidency in 1989, ARENA has delivered on its 
campaign promises to end the war and to reignite the economy. And, since its inception in the 
early 1980s, ARENA has become known for its discipline. In contrast to the PDC, which held 
the presidency between 1984-1989, ARENA managed, until late 1994, to remain untainted by 
charges of corruption. Unlike the CD/FMLN/MNR, it also has a large number of seasoned politi-
cians and activists at its disposal to mobilize the electorate. For many undecided and/or centrist 
voters, Calderón Sol and ARENA, more broadly, represented that most viable alternative with 
which to maintain economic and political stability. 
 
Electoral Laws 
Since promulgation of the constitution in 1983, presidents are elected to serve five- year terms. 
Re-election of presidents is prohibited by the constitution. If a candidate fails to obtain an 
absolute majority of the valid vote (which equals the total number of popular votes minus those 
that are annulled, blank or abstained) in the election, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal will 
convene a run-off between the two candidates that attract the largest numbers of valid vote. The 
1993 Electoral Code stipulates that this second round of voting must be scheduled within 30 days 
of the official declaration of the first round of voting. The candidate that then obtains the largest 
number of votes is declared president of the Republic. 
 
According to the Electoral Code, the 84 members of the Legislative Assembly are elected 
through the largest remainders version of proportional representation. 64 deputies are elected in 
14 departments; 20 are elected in a national, at-large district. Legislative Deputies serve 3 year 
terms and are eligible for re-election. In the aftermath of the elections, ONUSAL and other 
organizations called on the government to reform the electoral process. The US Citizens 
Observer Mission (USCEOM), in particular, suggested that a single, national registry be created 
on the basis of the electoral and the civil registries and that citizens be automatically furnished 
with a multi-purpose identification card. It also recommended that citizens be allowed to cast 
ballots in neighborhood precincts and that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal be de-politicized "so 
that all magistrates and other officials be competent and impartial professionals rather than 
political party representatives."
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 Whether and how the Electoral Code shall be reformed remains 
to be seen. 
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